By Sa’b Al-Sadid Al-Shammari
The Memorandum of Understanding begins with a protocolary preamble. However, one term in this preamble raises a fundamental question: “The United States and Iran and their allies announce…”
While America’s allies in this context are clearly known, the question remains: Who are Iran’s allies in this equation?
The second paragraph addresses the mutual respect between the United States and Iran for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Here, an important question arises: Does Iran possess the capability to threaten the territorial integrity of the United States? And how could such a threat materialize? (The discussion here focuses on territorial integrity, not sovereignty.)
The third paragraph enters the core of the matter, where the parties commit to reaching a final agreement within a maximum of 60 days. The U.S. administration leaves the door open by adding an important phrase: “extendable by mutual consent of both parties.”
The fourth paragraph marks the beginning of the game of terminology and interpretations. The United States commits to immediately lifting the blockade, obstacles, and harassments facing Iran within 30 days. However, the paragraph includes a misleading sentence directed at the Iranian negotiator: “Maritime traffic will be proportionate to the volume of traffic that Iran reactivates.”
Following this sentence, the paragraph returns to the essence of the commitment: “The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from Iran’s vicinity within 30 days after the conclusion of the final agreement.” Thus, everything mentioned earlier in the paragraph becomes tied to the period after the final agreement, not before it.
The fifth paragraph sees Iran committing to guarantee the safe and free passage of commercial vessels for 60 days, back and forth, immediately. The matter does not stop there; Iran is also obligated to remove technical, military, and mine obstacles within 30 days — all at its own expense.
Iran further commits to holding a dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, in consultation with the states bordering the Strait of Hormuz, to determine the future administration and maritime services in accordance with international law and the sovereign rights of the states bordering the strait. This raises a direct question: Where is the claim that Iran imposes fees on passage?
The sixth paragraph states that the United States and its regional partners (not international ones) undertake to develop a final, mutually agreed plan worth $300 billion for the reconstruction of Iran. Iran’s role in this plan is not mentioned; instead, Iran is presented merely as an investment opportunity.
After the final agreement, the United States speaks as the party granting the necessary licenses, guarantees, exemptions, and authorizations — as if it were the owner. It is also noted that the regional partners will be the actual owners of the Iranian economy.
The seventh paragraph grants Iran exemptions from sanctions, the removal of UN Security Council resolutions, and sanctions from the IAEA Board of Governors, in addition to U.S. exemptions. However, all these measures are conditional on a mutually agreed timeline following the conclusion of the final agreement.
The eighth paragraph sees Iran committing that it will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons and will not develop its program in that direction. The two sides also agree to resolve the issue of enriched material stockpiles, including reducing the level of enrichment at the site under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This means opening all nuclear sites and full disclosure of Iran’s nuclear program.
The ninth paragraph stipulates that, until a final agreement is reached, the U.S. and Iran agree to maintain the current status of the nuclear program — meaning the destroyed nuclear sites remain as they are, with no attempts at repair or reconstruction. In return, the United States pledges not to impose new sanctions and not to deploy additional forces.
The tenth paragraph states that, after signing the memorandum, the United States will issue exemptions for oil and petroleum derivatives. Here, the use of the term “exemptions” is noteworthy, as it implies restriction and commitment to a specific behavior by Iran, rather than full and unconditional lifting.
The eleventh paragraph sees the United States committing to making frozen funds available, but conditional on the implementation of this memorandum. The paragraph adds that the United States and Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. This means the discussion revolves around the procedures, not necessarily the immediate release of the full funds.
The twelfth paragraph provides for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to oversee the implementation of this memorandum and any subsequent agreement, which means American oversight and supervision over the execution — and even over any future agreement if reached.
The thirteenth paragraph returns to square one: After signing the memorandum, and conditional on the implementation of certain paragraphs (1, 4, 5, 10, and 11), negotiations on the final agreement will begin. This constitutes a clear time-manipulation tactic.
The fourteenth paragraph stipulates that the final agreement will be adopted through a resolution issued by the UN Security Council, making it internationally binding.
Conclusion
Everything the United States has offered in this memorandum consists of future promises conditional on Iranian implementation and commitment, within tight timelines that exert economic, political, and popular pressure. The United States is fully aware that Iran’s capabilities do not match the obligations the memorandum imposes on it within these short timeframes (30 and 60 days), making fulfillment difficult — if not impossible — in some clauses.
In this sense, the memorandum appears to impose crippling conditions on Iran that could be used to buy time. Time itself is one of the greatest challenges facing the Iranian regime. Iran will not be able to meet these commitments within the short deadlines; it is imposing impossible conditions on itself in order to prolong the survival of the regime — knowing that Iran’s end will ultimately be determined by the factor of time.
The carpet weaver has become the noose weaver who will hang himself with it.